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There is ample evidence that for at least the first thirty years of white
settlement in New South Wales work and its control was contested
terrain. During these years there was a complex, vibrant and at times
fierce struggle between convict workers and the colonial managers
of convict labour. This should not be surprising given that criminal
conviction and transportation did not fundamentally resolve the basic
labour management issue of the control of the labour process. It
may have established the cost of convict labour power to the State,
the price of convict labour, but it left untouched the challenge of
making convict workers productive, extracting labour use. Arguably,
extracting labour use from convict workers was more complex in
New South Wales than it may have been in many parts of British
industry. The convict labour force was perhaps even more hostile to
its work environment, less motivated, was under skilled, poorly
supervised and often physically unsuited to the work demanded of it
due to illness or previous lifestyle. Convict workers and managers
also had fewer or less resilient traditions upon which to rely than
free workers and employers in Britain.
While it is true that colonial managers of convict labour had
great powers of coercion there were in practice many limitations to
these. Governors could allocate convicts to any work they wished
but in reality up to 1822 were motivated more by the rational than
the whimsy or pathological. The physical punishments that could be
imposed by the State were also highly significant and loom large in
the convict work experience but there were such clear limitations to
brutality that its use was moderated until the early I 820s. It must be
appreciated that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
public violence was commonplace and modem sensibilities can
exaggerate the distress this caused.! But more importantly, flogging
damaged individual workers and significantly lowered their
productivity without measurably maximising the efforts of other
workers.2 Productive workers, particularly skilled ones, were critical
to the colonial economy. Hanging too had clear shortcomings as a
mechanism for controlling a labour force. Other forms of punishment
like working in chains were also understood by Macquarie's Principal
Superintendent of Convicts, William Hutchinson, to have inherent
limitations. 3
The convict system, on the other hand, denied the State the most
fundamental labour control mechanism possessed by all private
employers; dismissal. Unlike private employers in Britain (and even
in New South Wales) the government, as the owner of convict labour
power, had an indissoluble employment contract with all convicts.
It could not dismiss convicts from its employment as a means of
imposing control over the labour process. Nor could it use dismissal
as a threat. If a convict could not be assigned to a private settler or
was returned to the government, it had to find work for that worker
and support him or her by providing a legally specified quantity of
rations and clothing. The suffering caused by unemployment to a
free workforce had no impact on the way management treated or
organised its convict work force. There was also no Reserve Army
of Labour, or at least not one that could influence the nature of convict
employment. While it is true that convict workers could not legally
or freely choose their employer, there is evidence that they
consciously tried to position themselves within the labour
market. Convicts concealed or invented skills in order to

influence their allocation to specific types of work' and they displayed
a preference for different types or locations of public work. 5 However,
they were most active in exploiting the distinction between private
and public sector employment, often manipulating their allocation
from one to the other'i. To understand the convict work experience it
is essential to recognise the limitations that bonded employment
imposed on management and not just on the convict worker.
It can be argued that the need to extract labour use from a
workforce is a motive possessed only by management concerned
with surplus value. Historically the profit motive is certainly one of
the major mechanisms that fuelled the collective evolution of
management practice and strategy. However, the public sector can
be as equally motivated by the need to make its labour force as
productive and as cheap as possible. This productivity concern also
makes the extraction of labour use from labour power a critical
management task. The colonial authorities of New South Wales from
1788 to about 1822 were no exception. The economic circumstances
of white settlement in New South Wales during these years demanded
that convict labour be made as productive as possible. This
productivity imperative created the elaborate and large gang system
of organising male convict labour. A Colonial bureaucracy and
sophisticated management strategies were also developed in order
to administer and improve the work by the many gangs of convict
workers, particularly during the Macquarie years. It was only after
1822 that the growth in the public employment of male convicts in
work gangs began to slow while their administration became
increasingly concerned with the imperative of punishment.
For the first 34 years of white settlement colonial managers of
convict labour were vitally involved in extracting labour use from
convicts. This was achieved not simply by terror but through the
adoption of increasingly sophisticated ways of organising work, of
supervising it and of motivating the convict workers. Although the
State possessed the power of coercion this did not give it absolute
control of the labour process because male convict workers were by
no means powerless. As will be seen convict productivity and work
effort were the outcome of interaction between convict managers
and workers over the contested terrain of the labour process. An
effective analysis of this interaction and, in particular, the
management and convict strategies adopted at different times are
well beyond the scope of a paper such as this. However, this paper
will examine one of the most enduring management strategies
developed to extract a minimum quantity of work from male convicts:
Task Work.

Task Work: a compromised management strategy
One of the earliest and most important strategies developed by
colonial managers of convict labour was the Task Work system. Task
Work was an official designation of a minimum quantity of work, or
quota for individual convicts or more frequently a gang of convict
workers, which had to be achieved on either a per day or per week
basis. Commissioner Bigge explained it very well in his Report of
1822 when he observed it was "adopted more for the purpose of
securing and ascertaining that a certain quantity of labour
[was1performed, than of stimulating the quicker performance
of it".7 In other words, it was not designed or could not be

enforced in ways that maximised convict work effort but was intended
merely to extract an acceptable minimum quantity ofwork. The penal
system of New South Wales, despite drastic powers of coercion,
recognised the inherent and covert bargaining power of convict
workers in the labour process and calculated a minimum rather than
a maximum level of labour productivity.
Task Work began within the first months of the settlement. Faced
with shortages offood and other essentials like accommodation and
the fact that many of the convicts were in poor physical health,
Governor Phillip was required to minimise the hours of convict
labour. 8 As a consequence Phillip allowed convicts time off from
their public employment in order to grow food and build
accommodation for themselves and for the officers. The nature of
initial settlement created a distinction and ultimately a conflict
between private and government time. In order to balance these
interests Phillip negotiated acceptable minimum quantities of public
work with the male convict workers and so established the system
of Task Work. 9 This action alone was highly significant. Although
the convicts were not free, Task Work required the State to consult
and negotiate with them. 10
At around the same time Captain Hunter introduced Task Work
on Norfolk Island. He did this in order to extract an acceptable
minimum amount of work from his workforce but also to address
falling labour productivity caused by poor supervision and convict
hostility to government work. Hunter explained that he:
" .adopted the plan of tasking [the convicts], for which purpose I
consulted those whom I thought conversant in the different
employments that were carrying on: and their opinions, added to
what I observed myself, determined me to fix the different tasks as
follow, with which the are all content. Six men to cut the timber
down on an acre of ground a week: six men to clear away and tum
up an acre of ground fit for receiving seed, in twenty-eight days:
two sawyers to saw one hundred feet of sawying each day. At these
tasks the convicts would have an opportunity of saving time to
themselves; and, as that time was to be employed in clearing gardens
and ground to cultivate for their own use, what was thus saved from
public work would not be lost to society; although it has been feared
that some would pass their time in idlenessY
In practice Task Work was an effort to balance public and private
work interests. Where the Task Work was set too high the convicts
would have had insufficient time to provide for their own lodging
and other needs. Set too low and the convicts would have been able
to meet their private needs with time to "loiter about the streets to
the great annoyance of the inhabitants, and pass their time in gambling
and riot". 12 However not all convicts had the same marginal utility
for pleasure. Governor Hunter discovered that the sawyers at the
Hawkesbury settlement did not waste their free time but used it in
more enterprising ways. These sawyers had set their own Task Work
at some earlier stageD but by 1798 this was, in his opinion, too low
and was "no longer to be allowed". 14 The lowness of their Task Work
meant that these sawyers had a great deal of free time on their hands
which, in a spirit of enterprise, they used by selling their services to
the highest bidder - sometimes a private settler, sometimes even the
government. With a low Task Work quantity these sawyers were
free to spend considerable time working for themselves while the
scarcity of their skills and the demand for building materials meant
they were able to earn significant wages. It was their success that
must have particularly upset Hunter.
Task Work as a system of determining work quantity and
therefore effort also offered convict workers other benefits. As a
system of work organisation it encouraged the male convicts
to finish their Task as quickly as possible and this effectively
reduced the number of hours worked for the government by

the convicts. IS In this sense, Task Work must also be seen as a crude
motivational device. It encouraged productivity although did not
maximise it. However, apart from giving them free time and some
independence Task Work also altered the nature of supervision. In
the initial decade of settlement supervision was concentrated on
establishing that the Task was actually completed rather than on the
detailed control of the work performance itself. This reflected the
poor quality and scarcity of supervisors within the convict system
but it offered male convicts a degree of self-management. More
significant was the fact that despite clear signs in the early 1800s
that Task Work was not operating as effectively as it might in the
State could not abolish it or extend hours of work to a full day or
week. Instead Governor King attempted to make it more productive
by setting official Task Work for a variety of work in March 1801. 16
He established the following wage and Task Work rates:
WeekS Work

falling forest timber
?O 100
1.50
Burning off ditto
1.4.0
Breaking up new ground
0.13.4
Ditto stubble/corn
0.6.8
Chipping in wheat
Reaping in wheat
0.8.0
Threshing wheat (per bushel)
0.0.7
Planting corn (per acre)
0.6.8
0.6.8
Hilling corn (ditto)
Pulling & Husking Corn (ditto) 0.0.5
Pale splitting 6ft per hundred
0.2.6
Pale splitting 5ft per hundred
0.2.0

I acre
65 rod
65 rod
130 rod
I? acre
I acre 60 rod
18 bushels
I acre
I acre
25 bushels
800 (2 men)
1000 (2 men)17

Interestingly this Regulation not only established the Task Work
required of convicts employed by the government in gangs or
individually but also for convicts assigned to free settlers. Any male
convict who had finished his Task Work had to be paid according to
the wages rates above for any additional work. Essentially these Task
Work rates remained the required amount or quota for the work listed
until at least after the Bigge Inquiry and despite Macquarie's
discomfort with Task Work generally.18 Indeed, Macquarie seems to
have been unable to abolish it outright although the construction of
the Prisoner Barracks in Sydney was an elaborate strategy in the
struggle to remove, ifnot Task Work, then at least its most transparent
justification; the need of convicts to earn sufficient income to support
themselves. Over the years new occupations or activities were added
to the calculation and some rates were increased. A notable example
of the latter was again the case of the sawyers. Their Task Work
increased significantly but fitfully during and after the Macquarie
years but there is evidence that, unlike others, they resisted these
increases. Druitt confessed,
I have had more trouble with the Sawyers than any other Description
of convicts, & I attribute it to my obliging them to do a greater Portion
of work than ever they Did before ... 19
In 1817 Druitt not only increased their Task Work from "450
feet per week each pair" to 700 feet but required them to cut more
demanding types oftimber such as Iron Bark, Stringy Bark and Blue
Gum as well as the customary cedar, a very soft wood20 . In raising
this Task Work Druitt also increased the rations given the sawyers
by half, but those at Pennant Hills
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. .. in a body refused to do it; This continued for two or three weeks
when H.E. The Govr. [sic] Requested me to visit the Settlement &
and to speak to the people to represent to them that they were
only asked to perform the same work as their fellow prisoners
did in the Lumber Yard. I did so & there was a general murmur

r

throughout the whole body; & two men stepped fOlward close to
me; & said if all the men were of their way of thinking, that nothing
more than the old task should be done, as they considered the ration
of a pound & a half of beef & a pound & a half of flour not near
Sufficient for a man to work hard upon. They were extremely insolent
& I have no doubt wd. [sic] have made an attack upon me had not a
resolute Overseer been near me & ready to offer assistance. 2 !
Escaping from these 'striking' sawyers Druitt reported the
situation to Governor Macquarie who ordered that the two spokesmen
be flogged the following morning. Each was given 100 lashes "The
Greatest Punishment" that Druitt remembered ever being inflicted."
This swift and punishing response broke the strike "& from that day
the usual task required at the Lumber yard was performed by the
Sawyers at Pennant Hills"23. This example highlights not only the
power ofthe state over employment relations within the penal system
but also that convicts did quite openly resist. The actions of the
Pennant Hills sawyers, it should also be remembered, would have
probably been illegal for free workers. However, a postscript to this
dispute offers yet more evidence of convict bargaining power.
Defeated in their overt actions the sawyers resorted to more covert
resistance. Although the Task Work was increased, by 1820 it was
widely known that the sawyers were still completing this additional
workload with time to spare. The Task Work for "the Government
was done on Thursday Evenings of every week".24 In other words
the sawyers still withheld productive capacity from the government
and finished their government work by Thursday leaving Friday and
the half Saturday to be used in paid employment for themselves. 2s
They performed more work but could have performed even more.
Nevertheless, the government did not further raise the Task Work
despite a shortage of building timber. This acquiescence seems to
have arisen in part from the reality ofthe sawyers' covert bargaining
power.26
Other male convict workers, however, managed to balance
government and private work demands and ambitions with less
obvious conflict. The Grass Cutters Gang was employed in Sydney
to cut grass to feed government horses and those of the military
officers. The way the work of this gang was organised illustrates not
only the Task Work system in operation but also the reward system
that was used to motivate some gang workers.
Those of the grass-cutters that are well conducted, are allowed to
lodge in the town [Sydney], and after they have procured the quantity
that is given as a task to each man, they are allowed to dispose of the
surplus for themselves; those likewise who have been able to furnish
on the Fridays the quantity required for that day and the Saturday,
are allowed the use of the government boats to procure it for
themselves on the Saturday, and to sell it in the town. The daily task
to the grass-cutters has been raised lately from 40 to 60 bundles of
grass for each man ... 27
There is no evidence that the grass-cutters resisted this increase
in their Task Work. However, it is clear that, to encourage an
acceptable minimum level oflabour productivity from the convicts
employed in this gang, a number of very significant concessions
were given to them. If well behaved they were able to enjoy
independent life-styles outside the Barracks and in this way
minimised the penal system's regulation of their lives. Task Work,
in a sense, divided a convict's work effort into publicly and privately
owned spheres. As long as the convict grass-cutter produced the
required Task Work during his public employment he was then
allowed to work in a private capacity for part of the day or week.
And it was in this latter capacity that the system allowed reward for
greater personal effort. When working for themselves the
convict grass-cutters could increase their personal rewards by

increasing their work effort. But more than this, the personal or private
work effort of these convicts was subsidised by the public sector.
Government property, in the form of the boats, tools and even the
vacant land upon which they harvested the grass, was freely made
available to them. In other words, the State sanctioned private
enterprise amongst those convicts who conformed to acceptable
habits and patterns of behaviour.
By the middle of the Macquarie period the modification or setting
of Task Work for new jobs was determined by senior administrators
(management): the Chief Engineer, Principal Superintendent of
Convicts and even the Governor. While Superintendents, Principal
Overseers and Overseers may have been consulted they had no formal
or consistent input into the calculation of Task Work. Similarly, male
convict workers seem to have lost any overt role in the setting of
Task Work during Macquarie's administration. Of course this is not
to say the convicts were an unimportant consideration in the setting
of Task Work, only that their participation was covert. Given the
stability of Task Work and the slow response of government to abuses
or low levels of productivity, the spectre of convict resistance is very
apparent up to 1822. However, after this date the ability of convict
workers to resist management control of the labour process was very
significantly reduced.
After Macquarie Task Work as a strategy fell into disuse.
Governor Brisbane abolished many of the convict gangs that worked
under Task Work28 and reallocated convict workers to his new
Clearing Gangs. 29 These were gangs of male convicts employed to
clear new or existing land for free settlers at a price per acre. In
regulating the work ofthe convicts within these gangs there was no
direct reliance on Task Work. Each gang consisted of 22 convict
workers and a convict overseer and they were expected on average
to clear 15 acres per month but this was not a Task Work calculation.30
The varying physical conditions in different parts of the country
would have prevented any meaningful standard of work but more
importantly there was no longer any need for Task Work. Brisbane
designed extremely complex organisational structures and
bureaucratic controls to measure and monitor gang work performance
while overseer motivation was improved with monetary rewards and
convict motivation with extra rations. 3! With these reforms control
over and the motivation of the overseers were both improved, thus
addressing the traditional weaknesses of the convict system in New
South Wales; the poor quality and unreliability of the overseers.
Governor Darling, Brisbane's successor also made no use of Task
Work. While he abolished the Clearing Gangs and many ofthe other
convict gangs he imposed even more elaborate structures of control
on the convict labour process. Darling reformed the Road Gangs
and imposed the stringent and often brutal working conditions that
are commonly used to describe the convict work experience. Men
worked lumbered to logs of wood or in leg and sometimes also neck
irons. Even worse were the Penal settlements some of which
provided "the last penal infliction short of death".33 Under Darling
the hours of government work were extended to sun-up to sun set
and by 1827 the government had access to the whole of a convict's
working day34. The only exception made to these hours of work were
for some skilled mechanics in Sydney, who were still aIJowed Friday
and Saturday to work for themselves. This leniency was because
this arrangement had "prevailed so long that it could not without
some risk and great injury to the Town and Inhabitants be put a stop
to".35 However, in general terms the removal or abandonment of
Task Work, as a management labour process strategy was symbolic
of the defeat of convict resistance. The government no longer needed
to make the concession that Task Work represented to male
convict workers. This change occurred because the
administrative efficiency of Darling was so great and because

the labour of male convicts was no longer as important to the
government. While the road gangs performed useful and even
productive work36 there is no escaping the realisation that these gangs
were equally concerned with punishment and terror. Public
employment of the convicts was quite deliberately intended to punish
convicts and to strengthen the managerial prerogatives of private
employers of convicts. 37 By 1830 the relative importance of convict
workers had changed for the government and with this came a decline
in their ability to contest the control of the labour process.

Who Worked Under Task Work
The convicts most likely to perform their work under Task Work
were those whose work could be most easily quantified. These
included the convicts in the Brickmakers Gang, the Bricklayers Gang,
the sawyers at Pennant Hills, the stone cutters who were essentially
working with formed blocks of stone, most ofthe agricultural gangs
as well as the Shell Gang and Grass Cutters Gang.38 At Emu Plains
convict workers were "required to fell the timber on an acre of land
in the course of a week; and in buming it off, he is required to perform
ten rods per day".39 The Brick makers Gang was another in which
Task Work was an appropriate method of extracting an acceptable
level of labour productivity. As Barrie Dyster explains, brickmakers
worked in teams or 'sets'.
'A set' of brickmakers mined the earth, put it through the pug-mill,
pressed it into separate sanded moulds, emptied each brick from its
mould onto a pallet which, when full, was taken by barrow to drying
racks and left for several days before the bricks were stacked in the
kiln.40
In 1820 a brickmaking set of29 convicts produced 25,000 bricks
per week. 41 In 1825, Major Ovens estimated a brickmakers Set
consisted of only 15 men but they still produced 24,000 bricks per
week.42 Although the stone cutters were highly skilled, it seems that
because they were generally working with formed blocks of stone
their work too could be more reliably quantified. 43 Druitt claimed
stone cutters were required to cut 16 superficial feet a day while
"The good Stone masons are obliged to perform three perch of rough
work Per day".44
On the other hand there were a number of gangs whose work
could not practicably be quantified into meaningful Task Work. The
most obvious example ofthese were the road gangs. 45 Nevertheless
attempts were made. John Ford, the overseer of a Windsor Road
Party working at the Parramatta end was in Bigge's estimation "one
of the best and most experienced of overseers" partly because he
used his skill to attempt to set Task Work for his gang. 46 He attempted
to set the amount of work that 30 convicts working with six carts
could consistently achieve in two monthly periods. While he may
have been successful for his gang working on their stretch of the
Windsor Road, Bigge concluded that this Task Work could not be
applied elsewhere. As a consequence, the road gangs were regulated
by senior administrators fixing "a daily quantity of labour
proportionate to the difficulties and obstructions that occur"47 on
individual sections of individual roads. In this way the unique
difficulties posed by local terrain could be taken specifically into
account.
Another example of a non-Task Work gang was the Town Carters
Gang. The work of the carters would have varied from load to load
while delays and interruptions to their workflow would have been
unpredictable and often beyond the control of the workers or
overseers involved. Similarly, the boat crews were not on Task Work.
Their work, "governed by the state of the tides and wind",48 would
have made Task Work meaningless. It also appears that few
of the quarry or stone gangs were subject to Task Work. The

work of the quarrymen, blasters and stone labourers was perhaps
considered too variable or immeasurable for Task Work calculations
for reasons similar to the road construction gangs. As Dyster explains
"Stone differed from place to place, in grain, colour and ease of
working ... [while] ... convicts named one public quarry 'Heaven'
and another 'Hell' because of the difficulty of winning rock from
the latter" .49

Conclusion
In terms of Labour process theory the reasons why the management
of labour adopts any strategy is often as important or as interesting
as what that strategy is. Task Work, as a management labour process
strategy, was relatively benign. It set minimum not maximum levels
of work effort and in doing so offered male convicts a significant
range of benefits. Their hours of work were variable and generally
their working day was relatively short. It also gave them considerable
free time in which to normalise their lives and which, particularly
significantly, gave them access to a money-based private labour
market. In addition, Task Work reflected poor quality supervision
and so convict workers enjoyed a less direct style of supervision.
Moreover, the nature of supervision encouraged the negotiation of
flexible work arrangements between overseers and convictworkers 50.
Some bribed their overseer with a share of private earnings to be
absent from their gangs during working hours or they extracted a
less strenuous work regime. Task Work also left intact the male
convicts' ability to manipulate their work effort as the case of the
sawyers illustrated. And for these concessions, the State only
managed to extract a minimal level oflabour use, despite its enormous
powers of coercion.
Clearly then, why this labour process strategy, with all its
drawbacks for the State, was introduced and remained so durable is
a vital issue. The simple and most critical reason was simply that for
most of the period 1788 to 1822 the State desperately needed the
labour ofthe convicts. Whatever the penal objectives of transportation
were for the British government the economic realities that faced
each successive Governor until after Macquarie demanded the
effective utilisation of convict labour. Punishment could not be the
prime objective of transportation in New South Wales. It had to be
work because there was simply so much infrastructure that needed
to be established. However, this merely highlights the vulnerability
of the State in the employment relationship, its does not explain the
actual strategy of Task Work. Although the State needed productive
convicts it could not, in practice maximise labour use for a variety
of reasons. Firstly, the mechanisms of work control were so crude
and corrupt. The quality of work supervision was an immediate and
enduring problem while the convict overseers generally could not
be trusted to drive their subordinates. Secondly, other work or
organisational controls were also highly underdeveloped. Allocating
convicts to work they were qualified or experienced in was a difficult
administrative function from Governors Phillip to Macquarie.
Measuring and inspecting the work of gangs was also a difficult
administrative task. Although Macquarie gradually imposed an
increasingly efficient and certainly more rational bureaucratic
administration, the zenith of this structure awaited Governor Darling
in the second half of the l820s. A third reason was the limited effect
of the use of physical punishment to compel convicts to work harder.
On the other hand, the use of positive incentives was hindered by
the cost consciousness of British governments as Governors Hunter
and Macquarie were quick to complain. A final constraint on the
State's development of more effective labour process controls was
the bargaining power of the male convict workers themselves.
Some male convicts openly resisted management attempts to
increase their work efforts but many more were able to exploit
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their important economic role in the colony to covertly thwart
management.
The abandonment of Task Work in the 1820s was a symptom of
the maturity of the government's control of the labour process but it
also reflected the declining importance of convict labour to it. The
increasing numbers of convicts transported to New South Wales and
the allocation of 2/3rds of them to private settlers signalled the end
of an economically critical public sector. The government no longer
needed convict workers. In addition, the bureaucratic controls
introduced by Brisbane and Darling were much more extensive and
effective in controlling the labour process. Both introduced new and
more levels of supervision and administration, recruited more reliable
overseers who were better motivated and developed more stringent
methods of work measurement and accountability. They also both
increased the level of punishment inflicted on convict workers. By
the mid 1820s Task Work was an unsophisticated and irrelevant
management strategy. The male convicts lost the protection of a high
and sustained demand for their labour and had to battle with a more
mature and elaborate network of management controls. They
continued to resist and contest management's control of the labour
process but their ability to do so was much reduced.
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